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MAX AN ATHEIST TESTIFY BY VIRTUE OF SEC-
TIONS 605-606, OF THE CIVIL CODE OF
PRACTICE OF KENTUCKY.
By BASIL DUKE SARTIN.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the cases of Bush vs. Com. 80
Ky. 244; L. & N. R. R. vs. Mayes 26 R. 197; Bright vs. Com. 86 S. W.
527; White vs. Com. 96 Ky. 180, held that an atheist could testify by
virtue of sections 605-606 of the Civil Code of Practice of Kentucky,
which reads: "Subject to the exceptions and modifications contained in
section 606, every person is competent to testify for himself or another,
unless he be found by the court incapable of understanding the facts con-
cerning which his testimony is offered." The court construed the statute
to permit an atheist to testify because of the failure of the common
law requirement of religious belief to be mentioned in the exceptions
of section 606.
The purpose of this article will be to investigate the position of
the court on the above question and to show whether the court erred
in its decision.
It will be taken for granted in this investigation that the above
section should be construed in the light of the common law, as well as
in view of the evil it was intended to remedy. Therefore, in order to
know the true application and interpretation of section 605-6 of the
Civil Code of Practice of Kentucky, it is essential that we know the
history of that section, learn the evil it was to eradicate, as well as get the
intention of the Legislature when it was enacted. This involves the old
and complex problem of the negro. Therefore, let us for a short time
study the history of the negro race in the United States, likewise the
growth of slavery, together with its abolition in the state of Kentucky.
Permit me to say in the beginning of our investigation that it is
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
not the purpose of this article to worry the reader with a detailed ac-
count of the slavery problem in the United States, but it shall only be
mentioned where it is necessary for a thorough understanding and for
a proper construction of sections 605-6 of the Civil Code of Kentucky.
It will be remembered that after the invention of the cotton gin,
the South saw its great future in the raising of cotton, and the effort
to realize her dream, was the beginning of the history of the statute we
have now for construction. Laborers were needed in the cotton fields of
the South, and hence the demand for slaves grew ten folds. Inter state
slave trade flourished. But as eager as the South was for an extension
of slave territory, the North was as firm in defiance of its northern
advance. Laws were passed in every state concerning the rights of negro
slaves. The following extract from Smith's Political History of Slavery
will give an idea of the kind of laws which were passed regulating the
competency of negro witnesses in the state of Ohio.
"Under the territorial government the free blacks voted for delegates
to the convention to form a state constitution for Ohio, but in the con-
vention they were deprived of this privilege in the new state by the cast-
ing vote of the presiding officer, who was a Virginian and who became
the first executive. Under this influence the government was purely a
white mdn's government. After the reduction of suffrage in the Ohio
constitutional convention by the casting vote of the president, an attempt
was made to exclude colored persons from giving testimony in courts of
justice against white persons, which was defeated by a vote of 16 to 17.
Yet in the face of this, in spite of the obligation of the Ordinance of
1787, which secured the benefit of habeas corpus and trial by jury and
which was not changed or modified by the constitution, but confirmed
and continued; in. spite of other guaranties of personal liberties, the
Legislature in 1804: and 1807 enacted rigorous black laws which
provided:
1. That no black or mulatto should be permitted to settle or reside
in the state, unless he should first procure a certificate of his freedom
under a seal of a court of record.
2. That no black or mulatto person should be sworn or give evidence
in any court or elsewhere in the state, in any case where a white person
was a party or in any prosecution in behalf of the state against a white
person.
3. That no black or mulatto person should be entitled to trial by
jury even in cases involving his personal liberty, etc."
The state of Virginia did not always favor the slave trade. Vir-
ginia at one time enacted laws for the purpose of checking the importa-
tion of slaves into her territory and fixed heavy duties on every slave
imported. The following extract from Collin's History: "The Domestic
Slave Trade of the Southern States" will show Virginia's early stand on
slavery. "The General Assembly of Virginia in 1778 enacted thaf 'No
slave or slaves shall hereafter be imported into this -Commonwealth by
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sea or land nor shall any slave or slaves-so imported be sold or bought
by any person whatever under penalty of one thousand pounds for every
slave imported and five hundred pounds for every one sold or bought, and
the slave himself to be free., In 1785 a law was passed declaring.free the
slaves who -should afterward be imported and kept in the state a year,
whether at one time or at several times. 1806 a law was passed totally
prohibiting the introduction of slaves into Virginia. It was amended,
however, in 1811; in favor of the residents of the state as it restored to
them the same privileges concerning the importation of slaves which
they had under the law of 1778. An act of Jan. 9, 1813 further amend-
ed and extended to the immigrants the right of bringing in slaves." See
Henning Stat. at Large, vol. 9, p. 471. Ibid. vol. 12, p. 182.
The above extracts from the laws of Ohio and Virginia are only
mentioned for the purpose of introducing the 'tatutory regulations of
slavery in. the state of Kentucky, for public sei. ment is not always
confined by territorial limits of the states; nor were state laws regulat-
ing the rights of slaves always different in other states. So we find that
the laws of Virginia regulating the importation of slaves were in force
in the state of Kentucky till the year 1798, when An Act to reduce into
one the several acts respecting slaves, free negroes, mulattoes, and In-
dians was approved Feb. 8, 1798. See 2 Littell, or title 68-Emancipation
of Slaves-Stdtute law of Kentucky pp. 608-9.
Again in 1823, we find An Act to amend the law respecting the
Emancipation of Slaves was approved November 13th, 1823.. See Ses-
sion Acts pp. 260 or Statute law of Kentucky pp. 610.
The following extract from The Domestic Slave Trade of the South-
ern States, by Collins will also give light on the early stand of Kentucky
on slavery, "An act was approved February 18th, 1815, no one was al-
lowed to bring slaves into Kentucky except those intending to settle in
the state, and they were required to take the following oath :-I,- AB,
do swear (or affirm) that my removal to the State of Ken tucky was with
an intention to become a citizen thereof and that I have brought with
me no slave or slaves and will bring no slaves or slave to this state with
the intention of selling them." See Acts of Legislature 1814-15, pp.
435-6.
In 1833 it was enacted that each and every person who shall here-
after import into this State any slave or slaves or who shall buy any
slave or slaves or contract for sale or purchase for a longer term than
one year, of the service of any such slave or slaves, knowing-the same to
have been imported as aforesaid, he, she, or they, so ffending, shall for-
feit six hundred dollars for each slave so imported, sold or bought, or
whose services has been so contracted for. Ibid 1832-3, pp. 258.
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It was not to apply to immigrants provided they took the required
oath; nor to citizens of Kentucky who derived their title by descent, will,
distribution, marriage, gift or in consideration of marriage, nor to trav-
elers who could prove to the satisfaction of a jury that the slaves were
for necessary attendance. See Laws of Kentucky 1832-33, pp. 258.
The above acts indicate the position of Kentucky towards slavery
up to the year 1833. No decided change was made, however, in the law
of Kentucky regulating slaves till 1851. It will be remembered that near
the middle of the 19th Century was the beginning of bitter feeling be-
tween the North and the South. Kentucky in this controversy decided
to remain neutral, yet in sympathy and on the question of slavery she
was a Southern State. In 1854 a Code of Practice was prepared by Com-
missioners M. C. Johnson, James Harlan, and J. W. Stephenson and was
adopted by the General Assembly. In Section 669-70 of this Civil Code,
we find these provisions relative to the competency of witnesses: "All
persons, except those enumerated in the next section, shall be competent
to testify in a civil action. The following persons shall be incompetent
to testify:
1. Persons convicted of a capital offense, or of perjury, subordi-
nation of perjury, burglary, robbery, larceny, receiving stolen goods,
forgery, or counterfeiting. 2. Infants under the age of ten years, and
over that age if incapable of understanding the obligation of an oath.
3. Persons who are of unsound mind at the time of being produced
as witnesses. 4. Husband and wife for or against each other or con-
cerning any communication made by one to the other during the mar-
riage, whether called as a witness while that relation subsisted or after-
wards. 5. An attorney concerning any communication made to him by
his client to him in that relation, or his advice thereon without the
client's consent. 6. Persons interested in the issue in behalf of them-
selves and parties to an issue in behalf of themselves, or those united
with them in the issue. 7. NEGROES, MULATTOES, OR INDIANS,
in any action or proceeding where a white person in his own right or
as representative of a white person is a party except an action brought
to recover a penalty or forfeiture for a violation of law, against a negro,
mulatto or indian."
Note in sub-section 7 of the above extract that negroes were denied
the right to testifl in any court of justice. This is the first statute de-
nying them the right of giving testimony because of color. This in-
competency of negroes as witnesses existed in all the Southern States.
We also learn that many such laws were in force in some of the Western
States against the Chinese.
Again in 1866 we find in Kentucky Code of Civil Practice by Har-
vey Meyers these provisions, which slightly changed sections 669-70 of
ie Code of 1854, "All persons except those enumerated in the next sec-
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tion shall be competent to testify in a civil action." The next section
declares, "The following persons shall be incompetent to testify: Per-
sons convicted of a capital offense, etc.; infants, etc.; persons of unsound
mind; Husband and Wife; an attorney, etc.; persons interested in an
issue." In sub-section 7 of the above provisions we find again this condi-
tion, "NEGROES, MULATTOES, INDIANS shall be incompetent to
testify in any action or proceeding where a white person, in his own right
or as a representative of a white person is a party, except in actions
brought to recover a penalty or forfeiture for violation of law, against a
negro, mulatto or indian." This section was amended March 14th, 1866,
so as to read, "NEGROES, and MULATTOES, shall be competent wit-
nesses in all civil proceedings in which negroes and mulattoes are the only
parties interested in the issue, and in all criminal proceedings where a
negro or mulatto is a defendant."
This closes the statutes of Kentucky which expressly regulate the
competency of the negro as a witness and leads us to the statute, Section
605-6, of the Civil Code of Practice of Kentucky, which passed near the
year of 1872. The object of the acts regulating his competency as a wit-
ness have been set forth to show the nature of the facts and conditions
which underlie sections 605-6 of the Civil Code of Practice. It is neces-
sary for one to have a knowledge of the history of slavery previous to the
enactment of the above section, 605, in order to get the legislative intent
and to know the evil that the Legislature was endeavoring to remedy
when the above statute was enacted.
It will be remembered that between 1866 and the passage of Sections
605-6 of the Civil Code of Practice of Kentucky was the period of Re-
construction. The South had been crushed by the military powers of the
North. The slaves had been freed. Yet, the Southern States refused to
grant any privileges of citizenship to the negro by virtue of the 13th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In 1866, April 9,
Congress passed what is known as the "Civil Rights Bill" which per-
mitted a negro to testify against a white person in the State Courts. But
Kentucky in the case of Bowlin vs. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. 5, held that
the "Civil Rights Bill" was unconstitutional and void. Justice Robert-
son in delivering the opinion of the Court said: "Each state, so far
as not prohibited by her own Constitution or that of the United States,
has the unquestionable right to regulate her own domestic concerns and
prescribe remedies, including rules of evidence in her own courts. Con-
gress had no Constitutional authority to repeal or essentially modify
the law of Kentucky on the subject of negro testimony. A negro is in-
competent to testify against a white man under the laws of the courts
of Kentucky. The utmost legal effect of the emancipating section was to
declare the colored as free as the white race in the United States. It
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certainly gave the colored race nothing more than freedom. It did not
elevate tbem to social or political equality with the white race. It neither
gave nor aimed to give them in defiance of state laws all the rights of
the white race, but left them equally free in all the States, and equally
subject to State jurisdiction and State laws."
It is evident that Mr. Robertson was correct in his -decision. Con-
gress could claim no power by virtue of the thirteenth amendment. The
North saw that further amendment would be necessary so we find that
the fourteenth amendment was made to the constitution of the United
States. Yet after the passage of the fourteenth amendment we find the
courts of the State of Kentucky differing widely on the result of the
amendment. The following extract from the Lexington Reporter and
Observer, a newspaper published in Lexington, Ky., July 8, 1871 : "Does
the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the coustitution operate
as a repeal of Kentucky Statutes excluding negro testimony in actions
in which whites are parties? Judge Cofer of the Hardin Circuit Court
in a very able opinion, answered yes, and admitted negro testimony. He
had been followed by Judge Randall, Judge Wickliffe, and perhaps other
circuit judges. Judge Pryor of Carroll Circuit Court answered, no, and
refused to permit negro testimony as provided by Kentucky Statutes.
Judge Pryor has been and is very warmly in favor of the repeal of all
laws making a discrimination of the races on the question giving testi-
mony. But in an eloquent and able charge to his grand jury, held that
the fourteenth amendment had no application to the question. The
Court of Appeals has not as yet acted, and until it does, we shall have
presented the strange spectacle of two systems of law administered in
joining circuits. The same question arose in California regarding
Chinese testimony. In the lower court a person was convicted on Chinese
testimony, the court holding with Judge Cofer that the fourteenth
amendment repealed the statutes excluding such testimony. But the
Supreme Court of the state on appeal reversed the judgment, holding
with Pryor that the late amendment does not and can not affect the
state law regulating practice in the state courts. But from his decision
Judge Rhodes, a democrat, dissented. This case (People vs. Brady 6
Am. Rep. 604) is, we believe; the only one affecting this question whiqh
has been decided by the Supreme Court of a state."
So far as I can find the Court of Appeals of Kentucky never passed
on this question-Did the fourteenth amendment repeal all laws ex-
cluding negro testimony? But ever since the passage of the fourteenth
amendment and even before that time, we learn that negro testimony
became a political issue between the Northerners or Radicals, and the
Southerners. The following eKtract is an editorial from the Lexington
Reporter and Observer, June 8, 1869: "A Radical convention in this
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city, put forth one of the dogmas of its party-negro testimony. We are
unquestionably opposed to an extension to the negro race of any privi-
leges now possessed by those of our race and color and we can conceive of
no contingency in which we would advocate the conferring upon the
negro the right to testify in causes to which white persons are parties.
We hold this to be a government established for the benefit of our own
race and all the privileges to be enjoyed by virtue of its authority are
intended for that race alone. The rights of the negro are those which
his common humanity demands and which our own moral sense of right
and justice may impel us to concede. The ballot box, the jury, the
witness stand are privileges which are of right belong exclusively to the
Caucasian race. And we are unalterably opposed to any innovation
breaking down the barrier between the two races."
But on the other side of the issue of negro testimony we hear such
vindictives hurled against the position of the South as these by Sumner,
'qt is vain to say that this is the country of the white man. It is the
country of man. Whoever disowns any member of the human family as
brother, disowns God as father, and thus becomes impious as well as in-
human. It is the glory of republicans institutions that they give prac-
tical form to this irresistable impulse."
The following extract from Shaler's "Kentucky" p. 368, gives some
light on the problem of negro testimony in this state, and likewise cor-
roborates the thought that section 605-6 of the Civil Code of Kentucky
was enacted to permit negro testimony.
"The last important problem left by the war was the question of
negro testimony in the courts. The old slavery laws in Kentucky limited
the testimony of the negro in many ways; white men could not be con-
victed of grave crime by their evidence. These laws should have been
repealed at once, and it is clearly to the discredit of the State that they
remained upon the statute books until 1872, though negro testimony was
admitted in 1871. There is however, some excuse for this delay. The
Freedmen's Bureau had constituted itself the keeper of the whole negro
population, and had in an unfortunate way removed them from the control
of the ordinary civil law of the State. To the appeal for the abrogation
of the statute the people answered, do away with this interference with
negroes and we will give them equal protection before the law. When in
1872 the end of this system of supervision of the negro population by the
Freedman's Bureau was abandoned, the resistance to the complete assimi-
lation of the negro with the whites in all matters of the law came about.
The negro has been found a very trustworthy witness, and none regret
his full admission to the courts."
It will be unnecessary to note further the contention that existed
between the radicals and democrats upon the question of negro testi-
mony. It will suffice to say that the contest was waged with all the
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bitterness and stubornness which had marked the late contest of arms
between the North and the South, the North winning again by force of
numbers as on the battle field. Thus in order to end the controversy of
the courts over the effect of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal
Constitution we find the following bill introduced in the Legislature
of Kentucky with the following comment upon it by the Lexington
Observer and Reporter. The paper in publishing the proposed bill made
this criticism of the proposed law: "The following is an act to amend
the laws of evidence in this Commonwealth. A wider or more complete
revolution in legal practice was never ma de by Jacobin or Communist,
and if the people do not have cause to rue it, then we are vastly mistaken
in our apprehensions. It only required this act of humiliation to com-
plete the abjectness of the people of Kentucky to the dictation of their
radical task-masters. The next step will be negroes in the jury box, and
wherever else our masters shall appoint them to come.
"An act to amend the laws of evidence in this Commonwealth.
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Common-
wealth of Kentucky. No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any
civil action or special proceeding, by reason of his interest in the event
of the same, as a party or as otherwise; but such interest may be shown
for the purpose of affecting his credibility.
Section 2. Nothing in the preceeding section contained shall, in
any manner, affect the laws now existing relating to the settlement of
estates of deceased persons, infants, idiots, or lunatics, or the attesta-
tion of the execution of wills, or of conveyances of real estate, or of any
other instrument required by the law to be attested.
Section 3. Neither husband or wife shall be competent to testify
for or against each other, etc.
Section 4. No party shall be allowed to testify, by virtue of section
1, in any action or special proceeding where the adverse party is deaf
and dumb, etc., etc.
Section 5. No person who would, if a party, be incompetent to
testify under the provisions of section 4 of this act, shall become com-
petent by reason of the assignment of his claim.
Section 6. No person shall be deemed competent to testify in behalf
of his own interest, etc.
Section 7. NO ONE SHALL BE INCOMPBTENT AS A WIT-
NESS BECAUSE OF HIS OR HER RACE OR COLOR.
Section 8. This act shall be in effect from its passage."
It will be noticed that section 7 of the above proposed act contained
an express provision to the effect that no one shall be incompetent to
testify by reason of his race or color. No one would contend for a
moment that this section was not for the purpose of giving the negro
the right to testify in our courts. It is true that the above bill was not
passed verbatim as proposed, but in substance it is the same as the bill
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which was enacted-sections 605-6 of the Civil Code of Kentucky. The
amended bill, section 605 of the Civil Code, expresses the same thought
as was embodied in the original bill in sections 1 and 7. Note the exact
wording of the amended bill which was adopted in preference to the
original bill. "Subject to the exceptions and modifications contained
in section 606, EVERY PERSON is competent to testify for himself
or another unless he be found by the court incapable of understanding the
facts concerning which his testimony is offered."
The meaning which was intended to be conveyed by "every person"
was that Negroes, Mulattoes, and Indians should be competent witnesses
in civil actions, not that atheists, infidels, etc., should be permitted to
testify. It would be recklessness to put such application to section
605 of the Civil Code; for it is evident that the above statute, 605 of
the Civil Code was intended to eradicate one thing--discrimination be-
tween whites and blacks in giving testimony. There was no contention
between the atheist and the fidest, no intention on part of the Legislature
to permit the atheist to testimony, nor no desire on part of the masses.
Then how could the Court of Appeals come to the conclusion that Sec-
tions 605-6 of the Civil Code of Practice gave the atheist the right to
testify ?
I maintain that Sections 605-6 of the Civil Code of Kentucky had
one main object in view to accomplish, namely, to give the negro the
right to testify in our courts. No one ever thought of abolishing the
common law rule of religious belief prior to testifying in courts of jus-
tice, when the above section was enacted. It was enacted as has been
shown, to meet a change brought about by the Reconstruction in the
South. The original bill, newspaper editorials, public comment and
statutory regulations prior to its enactment, show clearly the evil which
was to be remedied-in equality between the whites and the blacks in
giving testimony. Hence giving the statute its proper construction, the
common law rule of religious belief is now in force in the State of Ken-
tucky. Later statutory enactments show that this idea is true. Section
680 of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the obligation of the oath and
expressly required that it shall be administered. Therefore, as the com-
mon law rule of competency is now in force in this state, when the proper
construction is given to Sections 605-6 of the Civil Code, I contend that
an atheist is incompetent to testify in the courts of Kentucky.
